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The Gentrification Trigger 
AUTONOMY, MOBILITY, AND AFFIRMATIVELY 
FURTHERING FAIR HOUSING 
Rachel D. Godsil† 
INTRODUCTION 
Gentrification polarizes. The term usually connotes a 
process where “outsiders” move into an area whose once-
attractive properties have now deteriorated due to disinvestment. 
The outsiders moving in are often, though not always, white.1 
This migration can lead to arguably positive outcomes. Increased 
demand results in an increase in property values—which, from a 
pure market perspective, seems like a net positive. Indeed, those 
who currently own property acquire greater equity, and the tax 
base of the city containing the gentrified neighborhoods expands. 
Moreover, gentrification of affluent outsiders would seem also to 
further society’s collective interest in residential integration. 
Residential integration has enormous potential to address 
inequalities of other sorts, such as education, access to job 
networks, and an increase in amenities resulting from the 
political capital of the outsiders.2 This too seems like a 
significant net positive. 
Why then is there significant opposition to gentrification 
by in-place residents?3 One concern is the possibility that the 
  
 † Eleanor Bontecou Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law; 
J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 1992. I would like to thank the participants 
in the 2012 Brooklyn Law School Trager Symposium for their thoughtful comments on 
earlier drafts of this essay as well as john powell and Michelle Adams for their 
intellectual inspiration. Seton Hall University School of Law assisted this project with 
a summer research grant. 
 1 See, e.g., john a. powell & Marguerite L. Spencer, Giving Them the Old 
“One-Two”: Gentrification and the K.O. of Impoverished Urban Dwellers of Color, 46 
HOW. L.J. 433 (2003). 
 2 Michelle Adams, Radical Integration, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 261, 303-05 (2006). 
 3 JACOB L. VIGDOR, DOES GENTRIFICATION HARM THE POOR? 1 (Sept. 2001) 
available at http://www.marealtors.com/content/upload/AssetMgmt/Documents/Gov% 
20Affairs/QoL/doesgentrificationharmthepoor.pdf (noting the negative reaction to 
gentrification, quoting a mayoral candidate in San Francisco who pledged in 1999 to 
declare “war on any and all gentrification”); cf. LANCE FREEMAN, THERE GOES THE 
 
320 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:2 
property-price increase will result in displacement—building 
owners will drastically increase rents or the increase in taxes may 
become too great for current property owners to bear.4 There is 
some dispute as to the degree of direct displacement of individuals 
due to gentrification (that is, evictions, failure to pay property 
taxes),5 but it is clearly the case that the economic and racial 
demographics of gentrifying neighborhoods often change 
dramatically.6  
In-place residents fear that the newcomers will change 
the culture and practices of the neighborhood. According to one 
caricature, “Housing prices balloon; boutiques and bistros 
blossom; and before you know it, some bearded dudes in vests 
have bought the local bodega and opened a saloon festooned 
with taxidermied animals.”7 While the caricatured image may 
be considered funny, the perceived loss to the in-place residents 
is not. Indeed, the pain of loss of community and the harm of 
lost autonomy have been well recognized in the eminent 
domain literature.8 
Nevertheless, some commenters contest the idea that 
in-place residents of gentrifying neighborhoods suffer a loss. 
These scholars suggest that in-place residents should be 
grateful for the influx of affluent residents and the capital they 
bring.9 Indeed, one could argue that gentrification has been the 
means by which our cities have avoided their predicted 
demise—for at various points during the twentieth century, 
scholars and public intellectuals have professed the “death” of 
the city and the “urban crisis.”10 Therefore, if gentrification is 
  
‘HOOD: VIEWS OF GENTRIFICATION FROM THE GROUND UP 4 (2006) (examining 
gentrification in Harlem and Clinton Hill in Brooklyn and finding no causal 
relationship between displacement and gentrification; rather, finding that the poor and 
those without a college degree are more likely to remain in a gentrified neighborhood).  
 4 powell & Spencer, supra note 1, at 446.  
 5 See FREEMAN, supra note 3, at 167; Lance Freeman & Frank Braconi, 
Gentrification and Displacement, 8 URB. PROSPECT 1, 2 (2002), available at 
http://www.chpcny.org. 
 6 See, e.g., VICKI BEEN ET AL., FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE & URBAN 
POLICY, STATE OF NEW YORK CITY’S HOUSING AND NEIGHBORHOODS (2011), available at 
http://furmancenter.org/files/sotc/SOC_2011.pdf. 
 7 Adam Sternbergh, What’s Wrong with Gentrification, N.Y. MAG. (Dec. 11, 
2011), http://nymag.com/news/intelligencer/62675. 
 8 See, e.g., Rachel D. Godsil & David V. Simunovich, Protecting Status: The 
Mortgage Crisis, Eminent Domain, and the Ethic of Home Ownership, 77 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 949, 978 (2008). 
 9 See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Rhetoric and Realities of Gentrification: Reply to 
powell and Spencer, 46 HOW. L.J. 491, 494-95 (2003). 
 10 See, e.g., Bruce London & J. John Palen, Introduction: Some Theoretical and 
Practical Issues Regarding Inner-City Revitalization, in GENTRIFICATION, DISPLACEMENT 
AND NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION 4 (J. John Palen & Bruce London eds., 1984). 
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understood as a market-driven mechanism that allows those 
with definable property interests to maximize the value of 
those interests, then our property system is working as it 
should. Although the result is increased rent—which may 
prevent some from remaining in gentrified areas—to many 
property scholars the degree of protection should increase with 
the significance of the property interest. A lease holder’s 
interest ends at the end of the lease. So while renters whose 
lease terms change may wish to remain, the interests of the fee 
simple holders in the gentrifying neighborhood are the only 
interests that matter from a legal perspective. And those who 
own their property have a choice either to remain or sell their 
properties for a significantly higher price. 
But not all adhere to this alluringly simple formulation. 
Many commentators argue that property rights in the fee title 
holder are far from absolute and that the “public,” however 
constituted, has an interest in how land—private as well as 
public—is used. Indeed, when issues of land use changes arise, 
laws and regulations often provide particular protection to 
those considered part of the “community,” suggesting that 
realizing “community preferences” should be among the goals 
that public land use controls seek to achieve.  
Yet even among those who agree that the public has an 
interest in land use controls and that community preferences 
should be weighed particularly heavily, it is far from obvious 
what degree of intervention these propositions support and 
who constitutes the community whose preferences we seek to 
anticipate and realize.  
Also salient is why community preferences ought to be 
important and what values we seek to recognize and conserve 
in honoring them. Without delving too deeply, I note that one of 
the foremost values legal recognition of private property seeks 
to serve is autonomy.11 Autonomy is understood as critical to 
the successful implementation of a liberal democracy—which 
relies upon its citizens to be active participants in governance. 
  
 11 See D. Benjamin Barros, Property and Freedom, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 
36, 37 (2009) (citing e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN, PROPERTY AS A GUARANTOR OF LIBERTY 
(1993); JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (1992); RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM (1999); 
BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND 
LAND-USE REGULATION (1997)). Two prominent works that justify property on the basis 
that it promotes individual freedom, both of which are discussed at length infra Part II, 
are Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) and MILTON 
FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962). 
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The voluminous discussions of how private property overcomes 
the tragedy of the commons12 also provide some underpinning 
to autonomy’s importance. If we hold land in common, the 
theory suggests, decision making about the land’s uses becomes 
too disaggregated and the incentives to hoard too powerful for 
the commons holders to maximize the value of land.13 By 
contrast, legally protected private-property rights are said to 
incentivize the individual property holder to maximize the 
value of her land through sound land use choices.14 
The notion of granting communities a say in land use 
decisions may seem anathema to autonomy—it suggests that 
the “many” will be able to dictate uses to the individual 
property owner. And yet, this sort of interference occurs with 
great frequency—zoning being perhaps the most obvious 
example. Nevertheless, in some contexts, autonomy interests 
are at stake that existing legal tools fail to protect.  
In this article, I focus on the gentrification of city 
neighborhoods that were abandoned during the government-
sponsored suburban migration of the 1950s through the 
1980s.15 These neighborhoods generally became racially isolated 
and economically depressed during this same period. The 
residents who remained did not choose to have the middle class 
abandon their neighborhoods, nor did they have the option to 
leave for themselves.16 Now, after decades where those who 
remained invested labor, time, and emotion in their 
neighborhoods,17 outsiders are moving in, and the residents who 
remained (or their descendants) are denied both the autonomy 
to prevent these changes and the means to exit to more desired 
environs. Accordingly, I argue in favor of broadening our 
conception of “interest” beyond those who hold definable 
property interests in the classic sense to include those who 
have invested in their homes and neighborhoods.18  
Although the notion of realizing community interests 
would seem to privilege in-place residents’ interests, and thus 
counsel against any further gentrification, this view wrongly 
  
 12 See, e.g., Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 
(1968); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the 
Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241 (2000). 
 13 Hardin, supra note 12, at 1244-45. 
 14 Id. at 1245.  
 15 See infra notes 26-33 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 30-35 and accompanying text. 
 17 See DEBBIE BECHER, THE INVESTMENT STATE: EVERYDAY ENCOUNTERS 
WITH EMINENT DOMAIN (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 9) (on file with the author). 
 18 Id. 
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assumes that the goal of realizing community preferences 
requires compositional stasis. Compositional stasis, needless to 
say, is neither possible nor normatively appealing. Residential 
change in neighborhoods is inevitable whether a neighborhood 
gentrifies or not.19 The problem, however, is that gentrification 
currently causes nonconsensual exit—and, as such, threatens 
the autonomy of the displaced in a way that is unlike a choice 
to move. But, by recognizing a broad scope of community 
preferences, the autonomy of in-place residents can be revived. 
The question that follows is how to protect the 
preferences of in-place residents. Often, these preferences are 
assumed to be simply to prevent gentrification from occurring. 
However, decrying or opposing gentrification is unlikely to halt 
the process of willing buyers purchasing property from willing 
sellers at increasing prices—which begins the cycle of 
gentrification. Nor will blanket opposition successfully ignite 
changes that confront the underlying challenges to autonomy 
and community that animate the deeply felt response to 
gentrification. A more nuanced approach is required.  
Many in-place residents—particularly renters—currently 
lack the ability to choose to remain when gentrification occurs. 
The forced exit of sizable numbers of community members is 
harmful both to them and to those who remain. The ideal 
response, as this article describes, is a vehicle that allows in-
place residents to remain but also allows them to choose whether 
to leave, rather than being involuntarily displaced. Such a 
vehicle would seem to blunt the criticism that gentrification is 
an illegitimate invasion by outsiders, and it would transform 
gentrification into a mechanism by which truly fair housing 
can be furthered. 
This article, inspired by eminent domain remedies and 
federal government mobility programs operated by the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), suggests 
the possibility of using rental vouchers or low-interest loans to 
restore the autonomy of in-place residents, providing them with 
viable, self-determining options to remain or exit the 
neighborhood. Indeed, the Fair Housing Act legally obligates HUD 
and its grantees to “affirmatively further fair housing,”20 and HUD 
  
 19 Indeed, poor residents are more likely to move than wealthy residents, and 
therefore, there is often more residential change in poor neighborhoods than 
“gentrified” neighborhoods. FREEMAN, supra note 3, at 4-5; SULEIMAN OSMAN, THE 
INVENTION OF BROWNSTONE BROOKLYN: GENTRIFICATION AND THE SEARCH FOR 
AUTHENTICITY IN POSTWAR NEW YORK 276 (2011). 
 20 Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3608. 
324 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:2 
has funds available to fulfill this mandate. The current absence of 
true autonomy and choice for in-place residents of gentrifying 
neighborhoods threatens the legitimacy of any integration that 
may occur as a result of the influx of new residents. 
This article is divided into two sections. Part I explains 
why gentrification is different from other neighborhood changes, 
arguing that the cause and effect of modern gentrification 
weighs in favor of government intervention. Part II argues that 
the existing land use legal toolkit is unavailable to in-place 
residents facing gentrification and offers alternative legal 
mechanisms to protect community interests. This section 
specifically examines the circumstances that would trigger 
government intervention and discusses the HUD funds available 
to implement these proposals. 
I. WHY IS GENTRIFICATION DIFFERENT? 
Many neighborhoods undergo significant change. A 
suburban neighborhood of small homes will become popular, 
and individuals with greater resources will purchase the homes 
with the goal of tearing them down and rebuilding on a 
significantly grander scale. A small town will see an influx of 
chain stores that threaten extant businesses as well as the 
distinctive culture of the town.  
Like gentrification, these changes are often hotly 
contested by residents other than the individual property owner 
who stands to benefit from the change. The “community” prefers 
the existing scale of homes over McMansions, and it prefers a 
certain aesthetic that the signage and visual impact of chain 
stores will disrupt. But this opposition to change differs in two 
respects from the opposition associated with gentrification. 
First, there is a strong argument to be made that our legal 
system has adequate mechanisms in place, such as zoning and 
subdevelopment permitting requirements, to address 
community interests in the context of a suburb or small town.21  
Second, as discussed in greater detail below, the in-
place residents in neighborhoods subject to gentrification 
consider their neighborhoods to have been intentionally 
abandoned and allowed to deteriorate by both governmental 
actors and the forebears of the people now seeking to “gentrify.” 
The in-place residents who oppose gentrification tend to be 
  
 21 See infra notes 62-71. 
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residents who lived through the period of abandonment and 
deterioration—or their children. For in-place residents, then, 
the notion that they will be displaced now has an extreme—
and often racialized—resonance. 
A. Defining Gentrification 
Gentrification generally refers to a process where a 
once-affluent area, which has been abandoned and is now 
occupied by working-class or poor people, is rediscovered by the 
affluent. Typically, neighborhoods that are gentrified possess 
the following characteristics at a particular point in time: 
deteriorating housing, generally low property values, high 
crime, few amenities, and substandard schools.22  
The term “gentrification,” perhaps not surprisingly, was 
initially used in England by sociologist Ruth Glass in the mid-
1960s to describe changes in coastal villages and London 
neighborhoods.23 Glass’s interest stemmed from the changes she 
observed initially in her own London neighborhood as Victorian 
lodging houses were rehabilitated and sold to single families, 
displacing the working-class renters.24 Her characterization of 
the phenomenon of an upgrading housing stock and the influx 
of higher income homeowners is now the common 
nomenclature and is used internationally in both academic 
literature and cultural conversation. 
The popularity of the term is interesting since “gentry” 
is a descriptor rarely used in the United States; it refers to a 
class status—landed aristocracy or nobility—that was 
expressly rejected by the Founding Fathers, even if some lived 
lives that closely replicated this class.25 And despite the rare 
use of the term, the phenomenon is the same in the United 
States, where gentrification is used to describe the “process of 
upper-status groups replacing lower-status groups in inner-city 
neighborhoods that had previously experienced ‘decline.’”26 
  
 22 Tom Slater, Gentrification of the City, in THE NEW BLACKWELL COMPANION 
TO THE CITY 572, 573 (Gary Bridge & Sophie Watson eds., 2011). 
 23 London & Palen, supra note 10, at 7. 
 24 Slater, supra note 22, at 571. 
 25 Id. 
 26 London & Palen, supra note 10, at 7. 
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B. Who Lives in Gentrifying Neighborhoods and What Level 
of Autonomy Do They Have?  
In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries in 
the United States, the neighborhoods ripe for gentrification are 
most often inhabited by black and Latino families and individuals 
in urban areas.27 The phenomenon is not race specific, however, 
and can occur wherever poor and working-class residents live in 
neighborhoods possessing certain characteristics.28 The unifying 
features of neighborhoods likely to be subject to gentrification are 
a high rate of renters, housing stocks with high architectural 
value, ease of access to job centers, vibrant culture and street life, 
comparatively low housing prices, and perhaps ironically, racial 
and ethnic diversity.29 
The arguable difference between the first wave of 
gentrification—where artists and bohemians, followed by the 
middle and upper class, moved into neighborhoods at one time 
comprised of white ethnics—and the second—where the 
affluent are moving into neighborhoods that have become 
predominantly Black and Latino—is the role of choice or 
autonomy available to the in-place residents. Some white 
ethnics had options to remain in gentrifying neighborhoods—
and often saw their property values increase exponentially—
while others migrated to the suburbs. 
The story of white ethnics’ migration to the suburbs is an 
old one—as is the resultant abandonment and disinvestment of 
urban centers to blacks and Latinos.30 White ethnic groups and 
new white immigrant groups in the early twentieth century were 
likely to congregate in neighborhoods with others who shared 
their origins; however, most neighborhoods contained multiple 
ethnic groups. More significant, the children of white ethnic 
  
 27 MAUREEN KENNEDY & PAUL LEONARD, DEALING WITH NEIGHBORHOOD 
CHANGE: A PRIMER ON GENTRIFICATION AND POLICY CHOICES 2 (Apr. 2001), available at 
http://www.policylink.org/atf/cf/%7B97C6D565-BB43-406D-A6D5-ECA3BBF35AF0% 
7D/DealingWithGentrification_final.pdf. 
 28 See, e.g., Justyna Goworowska, Gentrification, Displacement in the Ethnic 
Neighborhood of Greenpoint Brooklyn 5-6 (2008) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University 
of Oregon), available at https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/jspui/bitstream/1794/7764/ 
1/Goworowska_Justyna_MA_spring2008.pdf. 
 29 KENNEDY & LEONARD, supra note 27, at 9-12; see also generally JANE 
JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961) (a classic account of 
the harm of suburban homogeneity, top-down planning, and a celebration of mixed use 
land use patterns which create dynamic and diverse communities).  
 30 See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: 
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 77 (1993). 
2013] PRESERVING AUTONOMY 327 
 
immigrants typically assimilated quickly and purchased homes 
outside of the “ethnic ghetto,” usually within a generation or two.31 
The experience of black people in the Northeast and 
Midwest and Latinos in the West was different in kind. Rather 
than being able to enjoy the social mobility granted to white 
ethnics, “blacks were trapped behind an increasingly 
impermeable color line.”32 This trap was double-edged. Black 
families were prevented from moving to the suburbs or white 
neighborhoods within cities and simultaneously denied resources 
to maintain the inner-city neighborhoods abandoned by whites.33 
Black families (and Latinos in the West) were denied 
housing choice through both legal and extralegal means. The 
extralegal barriers consisted of the once-tolerated and now-
deplored harassment and violence that arose when a black 
family sought to move to a white neighborhood.34 The legal 
barriers consisted of the use of racially restrictive covenants as 
well as “exclusionary” zoning that created significant class 
barriers to suburban migration.35 In the 1940s, the real estate 
  
 31 See Rachel D. Godsil, Viewing the Cathedral from Behind the Color Lines: 
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Environmental Racism, 53 EMORY L.J. 1807, 1840 
(2004); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 30, at 32. For example, in what was referred to 
as the “Irish ghetto,” the majority of the residents were not, in fact, Irish, and only 3% 
of Chicago’s Irish population lived there. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 30, at 33. By 
contrast, in the black ghetto, blacks constituted 82% of the population and 93% of 
Chicago’s black population lived there. Id. at 32-33; see STANLEY LIEBERSON, ETHNIC 
PATTERNS IN AMERICAN CITIES 44-58, 182-90 (1963) (providing a rich description of the 
residential movement of different white ethnic groups). 
 32 MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 30, at 33. 
 33 Godsil, supra note 31, at 1838-40. 
 34 Id. at 1840. The violence took the form of harassment of black families who 
moved into white neighborhoods that sporadically escalated into rock throwing, gun 
shots, cross burnings, and physical attack. Id. If the black family refused to move, the 
last step was bombing. Id. In Chicago, a black home in a white neighborhood was 
bombed once every twenty days between 1917 and 1921—in all, fifty-eight homes were 
bombed. Id. at 35. This violence recurred during the Civil Rights Movement’s attempt 
to open housing. In the “Open Housing Campaign” that was waged in Chicago in the 
summer of 1966, marchers in working class white neighborhoods were confronted by 
[w]hites shouting “white power!” [who] threw bricks and bottles at the 
marchers, striking civil rights leader Jesse Jackson and injuring more than 
fifty demonstrators. When marchers made for the cars they had left in the 
park under police supervision they found that two had been pushed into the 
lagoon, over ten had been set on fire, and many more had broken windows 
and slashed tires . . . . 
Sarah Asrat & Philip Tegeler, Poverty & Race Research Action Council, Launching the 
Fair Housing Debate: A Closers Look at the 1966 Chicago Freedom Movement (2005), 
PRRAC.ORG, available at http://prrac.org/full_text.php?text_id=1047&item_id=9645& 
newsletter_id=0&header=Current%20ProjectsSeparationofPowers. 
 35 Godsil, supra note 31, at 1843, 1864. Racially restrictive covenants 
typically prohibited property owners from selling, occupying, or leasing their property. 
Porter v. Johnson, 115 S.W.2d 529 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938). Of course the Supreme Court 
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industry actively and successfully promoted the use of racially 
restrictive covenants.36 A standard covenant stated that a 
property “shall not be used or occupied by any person or 
persons except those of the Caucasian race.”37 In certain areas, 
“restrictive racial covenants were inserted in [as many as] 
eighty percent of . . . deeds.”38 Civil rights groups brought legal 
challenges to restrictive covenants, and enforcement of such 
covenants was held to be unconstitutional in 1948.39 Despite the 
successful legal challenge, the covenants often remained an 
impediment to housing choice for blacks and Latinos because 
white homeowners continued to honor them and many 
contractors found it impossible to obtain financing to build 
homes in newly developing suburban subdivisions for minority 
residents.40 Realtors were also reluctant to violate deed 
restrictions for fear of “risk[ing] the wrath of . . . homeowners 
and jeopardiz[ing] their businesses.”41  
In addition to express racial restrictions, other covenants 
regulating the size and aesthetics of new homes also had the 
effect of excluding many black and Latino families.42 These 
restrictions—which included preventing the construction of 
multifamily housing, requiring large lots and square footage, and 
specifying architectural standards—“subtly preserved social 
homogeneity”43 but were rarely challenged with success in courts.44 
  
held that the enforcement of racially restrictive covenants was unconstitutional in 
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). The Court decided this case not on equality 
grounds, but rather on property rights grounds: “The right which the ordinance 
annulled was the civil right of a white man to dispose of his property . . . to a person of 
color, and of a colored person to make such a disposition to a white person.” Buchanan, 
245 U.S. at 81; see also Jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards to Gentrification: Explicating a 
Right to Protective Zoning in Low-Income Communities of Color, 77 MINN. L. REV. 739, 
776 (1993). They were also used in some areas against Jews, Catholics, and the Irish. 
See KAREN BRODKIN, HOW JEWS BECAME WHITE FOLKS AND WHAT THAT SAYS ABOUT 
RACE IN AMERICA 47-48 (1998). However, their use was most widespread against 
blacks. See generally THOMAS LEE PHILPOTT, THE SLUM AND THE GHETTO: 
NEIGHBORHOOD DETERIORATION AND MIDDLE-CLASS REFORM, CHICAGO, 1880–1930, at 
189-93 (1978). 
 36 See THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND 
INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR DETROIT 44 (1996). 
 37 Id. 
 38 Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Integration Game, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 1965, 1978 (2000). 
 39 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19-23 (1948) (holding that judicial 
enforcement of racially restrictive covenants constituted impermissible state action 
violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 40 SUGRUE, supra note 36, at 45; Godsil, supra note 31, at 1844.  
 41 SUGRUE, supra note 36, at 45. 
 42 SUGRUE, supra note 36, at 45; Godsil, supra note 31, at 1848. 
 43 SUGRUE, supra note 36, at 45. 
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As a result of these legal and extralegal mechanisms, 
blacks and Latinos were forced to remain in urban centers and did 
not have the choice to transition to suburban living. Thus, an 
unwilling population continued to inhabit the urban neighborhoods 
that are now desirable as people begin to choose city living again 
and seek affordable properties in emerging neighborhoods.  
C. The Role of Government in Property-Value Decline in 
Urban Communities  
If gentrification occurs when an area experiences 
increased property values as a result of outsiders who identify 
undervalued property, it is important, as a preliminary matter, 
to note what caused the initial undervaluation. If the causes of 
decline and renewal are simply a result of individual preferences 
and consensual market exchanges, the argument in favor of a 
laissez-faire approach seems strong. It is exceedingly clear, 
however, that in the context of urban neighborhoods, declining 
property values are a direct consequence of decisions made by 
the federal government, bankers, and real estate brokers.45 
Historian Thomas Sugrue has shown that the boundaries 
between these three groups were blurred as bankers, real estate 
executives, and developers moved back and forth from 
government service to private practice.46 The private hand of the 
market was consciously manipulated to cause a decline in 
property values and the quality of life in urban neighborhoods. 
From the post-World War II period through the 1970s, 
the federal government engaged in programs enhancing the 
autonomy of white families to purchase homes and move to the 
suburbs, while simultaneously disinvesting in urban centers 
and contributing to the exclusion of black and Latino families 
from those same suburbs. In particular, three federal programs 
combined to provide unprecedented opportunities and 
autonomy for even middle-class white families: the federal 
subsidization of highways, the Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA), and the Veterans Administration (VA) home ownership 
loan programs. Moreover, some of these same programs 
resulted in massive displacement of poor people and the 
destruction of established neighborhoods.  
  
 44 Cf. S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.), 
appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975). 
 45 SUGRUE, supra note 36, at 43. 
 46 Id.  
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In every major city, highway construction destroyed 
working-class neighborhoods as homes were leveled to make 
way for expressways, on and off ramps, and overpasses.47 These 
neighborhoods were comprised of many ethnic groups; however, 
the white ethnics were able to benefit from the highway 
construction because it enabled easy commutes to and from the 
suburbs.48 
These moves to the suburbs were subsidized by the 
government through the FHA and VA loan programs.49 These 
loan programs guaranteed loans made by private banks to 
prospective homebuyers, allowing new buyers to purchase 
homes with only a 10-percent down payment. Before the advent 
of the federal programs, banks generally required “at least 33% 
and often 50% down payment.”50 The federal programs also 
allowed buyers twenty-five- to thirty-year repayment periods, 
lowering monthly payments significantly.51 Finally, the loan 
guarantee reduced risk to banks and thus resulted in lower 
interest rates. “The combination of lower down payments, 
lower interest rates, and longer repayment periods made home 
ownership a ‘mass phenomenon for the first time in American 
history.’”52 
This phenomenon did not extend to black and Latino 
families. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board, working with real 
estate brokers and lenders, created Residential Security Maps 
and Surveys to determine eligibility for mortgage guarantees and 
home loans.53 These maps subdivided metropolitan areas into 
sections ranked from A (which were shown on the map as green) 
to D (which were shown as red), with green as the safest 
investment and red as the riskiest.54 The rankings took into 
account indicators such as the age and condition of buildings 
and the amenities in the neighborhood. But most important in 
the classification “was the level of racial, ethnic, and economic 
  
 47 See Mike Jones, Public Roads: We’re on the Eve of Construction, 62 PUB. 
ROADS, Nov. 1998, available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/research/.../ 
pavements/.../publicroads/98novdec/eve.cfm (discussing the displacement of families by 
federally funded highway projects). 
 48 Godsil, supra note 31, at 1846-47. 
 49 The National Housing Act of 1937 created the FHA program. “[T]he VA 
[loan] program was authorized by the Serviceman’s Readjustment Act of 1944.” See 
MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 30, at 52-53. The FHA established standards and 
procedures that were subsequently adopted by the VA. See id. 
 50 Godsil, supra note 31, at 1848. 
 51 Id. at 1846-47. 
 52 Godsil, supra note 31, at 1848 (quoting MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 30, at 53). 
 53 SUGRUE, supra note 36, at 43. 
 54 Id. 
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homogeneity,” and whether the neighborhood contained “a 
lower grade population.”55 In other words, the mere presence of 
black and Latino residents caused a neighborhood to be 
considered high risk and coded red. This practice led to the 
term “redlining.”56  
The effect of the redlining was acute. Residents in 
neighborhoods ranked C or D were unable to obtain loans 
either to purchase or upgrade their homes, and developers had 
great difficulty finding financial support for building in such 
neighborhoods.57 For example, FHA lending in suburban Long 
Island was approximately sixty times greater than in the 
Bronx and eleven times greater than in Brooklyn.58 Redlining 
also prevented black and Latino families from obtaining 
financing for homes in suburban neighborhoods—lest the 
neighborhood in which they sought to purchase become 
heterogeneous and thus subject to a C or D ranking. FHA 
redlining practices sometimes resulted in whole cities being 
“declared ineligible” for FHA-guaranteed loans because of their 
minority presence.59 Indeed, in 1966, the FHA had no loans at 
all in the city of Camden.60 The FHA redlining policies were not 
income-based; middle-income blacks and Latinos were also 
denied loan guarantees. The result was a massive capital 
disinvestment in inner cities. The lack of mortgage capital in 
minority communities made it exceedingly difficult for people 
to sell or repair their homes, causing a downward spiral of 
“disrepair, deterioration, vacancy, and abandonment.”61 
The federal government did not act alone. Decisions 
about where to place highways and other unwanted land 
uses—such as the concentration of large public housing 
projects—all were made at the local level.62 The central role of 
government in creating the deteriorating conditions that now 
lend themselves to gentrification and reduced autonomy for in-
place residents suggests that it is appropriate for the 
government to now play a role in addressing gentrification and 
enhancing such autonomy. 
  
 55 Id. at 44. 
 56 Godsil, supra note 31, at 1849. 
 57 See SUGRUE, supra note 36, at 44; Godsil, supra note 31, at 1849. 
 58 KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF 
THE UNITED STATES 211 (1985). 
 59 Id. at 213. 
 60 Id. 
 61 MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 30, at 55. 
 62 See Godsil, supra note 31, at 1848 n.240.  
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D. Explaining the Racialized Opposition to Gentrification  
Prominent civil rights scholars who promote racial and 
economic housing integration simultaneously critique 
gentrification.63 In light of the fact that gentrification has led to 
greater racial and economic heterogeneity in neighborhoods, 
this opposition may seem paradoxical. Once gentrification is 
contextualized as part of the continuum that includes exclusion 
from suburbs, denial of resources, and white abandonment of 
cities, the paradox is explained. Gentrification of predominantly 
black and Latino neighborhoods, like housing discrimination 
and exclusion, denies autonomy to the in-place residents. 
Accordingly, the housing patterns that result are not 
experienced as “integration,” but instead like an invasion.64 In 
an article entitled Gentrification; Personal Reflections, reporter 
Julianne Malveaux asks, “Will those who see the neighborhood 
as gleaming and upscale now try to get rid of others who see 
the neighborhood, simply, as the place where they live and 
survive?”65 Scholars assert that “gentrification has a very clear 
racial component,”66 some using language such as “ethnic 
cleansing” to refer to change in racial composition of places 
such as Maxwell Street in Chicago.67 In the city of Oakland, 75 
percent of those evicted since 1998 have been people of color—
and the eviction rate rose 300 percent.68 Dramatic changes in 
racial composition can also be found in neighborhoods in 
Brooklyn, Washington, D.C., and Minneapolis over the last 
decade.69 Particularly distressing is the argument that 
gentrification that displaces poor people of color has been 
encouraged by federal housing policy and can be likened to 
reverse redlining, as financing has allowed newcomers to 
purchase in inner-city neighborhoods.70 
The history of displacement helps explain why the influx 
of whites to urban neighborhoods is less likely to be seen as a 
  
 63 Compare john a. powell, Living and Learning: Linking Housing and 
Education, 80 MINN. L. REV. 749, 758 (1996), with powell & Spencer, supra note 1, passim. 
 64 See powell & spencer, supra note 1, at 456-57. 
 65 Id. at 433 (quoting Julianne Malveaux, Malveaux at Large: Gentrification; 
Personal Reflections, SUN REPORTER, Aug. 23, 2001, at 6) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 66 Id. at 436. 
 67 Id. at 438. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 437-38; see also VICKI BEEN ET AL., FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE & 
URBAN POLICY, STATE OF NEW YORK CITY’S HOUSING & NEIGHBORHOODS 2010, at 61, 
65 (2010).  
 70 powell & Spencer, supra note 1, at 453. 
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promising new advent of integration. Residents of urban 
neighborhoods lived through the experience of neighborhood 
decline as their white neighbors moved to the suburbs—an option 
unavailable to them. The move of suburbanites back to cities may 
be seen as continuing a cycle in which others exercise autonomy, 
while poor people of color often lack a corresponding choice.  
II. LEGAL MECHANISMS TO PROTECT COMMUNITY INTERESTS 
If the in-place residents of a small town or suburb feel 
strongly about the scale and design of homes, the tacky signage of 
a chain store, or even the intensive development of open space, 
there are a range of legal and regulatory options available. The 
primary mechanism, of course, is zoning. Standard zoning tools of 
maximum height requirements, setback rules, and floor area 
ratios—supplemented by modifications such as “cubic content 
ratio”—are readily available to protect against certain changes, so 
long as the residents can garner sufficient political support.71 
Some communities have also imposed aesthetic zoning 
requirements and design review as part of the permitting 
process.72 Other powerful existing tools are requirements for 
permits for subdivision with associated design conditions, 
historical districts, and emerging open-space requirements.73 
The “up-scaling” of reasonably stable urban neighborhoods 
shares many of the same characteristics of standard new 
developments: it alters the current aesthetic and uses norms of a 
particular area. The existing land use legal toolkit, however, is 
rarely at play to protect community interests. The reasons are 
myriad. A simple, but important, difference is scale and 
political power. Most of the cities where gentrification has 
already occurred or where it is currently underway are fairly 
large, and even during the nadir of American cities, most 
retained a financial base of middle-class residents, wealthy 
residents, and job sources. New York, San Francisco, 
Philadelphia, Boston, and Chicago all saw significant decline in 
the post-World War II period through the 1970s, but they never 
were abandoned to the degree of cities like Detroit, Newark, 
  
 71 Needless to say, these zoning devices are subject to the standard 
comprehensive plan requirements, and may not be imposed ex post. 
 72 Timothy Bates, McMansions and Geometry of Zoning, 66 PLANNING 
COMM’RS J., Spring 2007, at 1, available at http://www.rc.com/documents/McMansions_ 
and_Geometry_of_Zoning_PCJarticle.pdf. 
 73 See, e.g., THOMAS JEFFERSON PLANNING DIST. COMM’N, DESIGN MANUAL 
FOR SMALL TOWNS (Jan. 2004), http://www.tjpdc.org/pdf /rep_comm_designManual.pdf. 
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Hartford, or Camden. Accordingly, when “gentrification” 
begins—when outsiders with more capital move into abandoned 
neighborhoods—the current residents have to counter the 
political might of the extant middle class of the city.  
In addition, gentrification often does not result in 
changed use in the traditional sense. The brownstones or old 
Victorian mansions that were used for housing in the pre-
gentrification period are being used for housing now. The 
difference is only who is living in the house. The bodegas, small 
hardware stores, and social clubs are replaced by other retail 
uses—boutiques, upscale restaurants, and cafes. None of these 
require zoning changes. This means that in-place residents of 
gentrifying neighborhoods lack many of the current land use 
controls that others utilize to protect their autonomy, and new 
devices are needed to afford that protection.  
In-place residents appear to have two separate but 
related bases to oppose gentrification: displacement74 and 
cultural change that reflects the interests of the incoming 
gentrifiers. Displacement of both residents and businesses is a 
result of increased demand for housing and commercial space, 
which results in higher rental and purchase prices. Cultural 
change is caused in part by the newly arriving upscale retail 
stores, the loss of long-known retail proprietors, and the 
different habits and norms of the gentrifiers. Without access to 
existing land use tools, in-place residents must look elsewhere 
to address these concerns. But in order for these new devices to 
take shape, two threshold matters must be resolved. First, 
governments will need to decide what level of gentrification 
warrants intervention, and second, they will need metrics to 
determine which residents qualify for protection. To the extent 
that any intervention requires expenditures, in these budgetary 
times, governments will also need to identify sources of funds. 
  
 74 The literature addressing the harm from the loss of a home is voluminous. 
For an overview, see Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 255, 279 (2006) (citing e.g., Marc Fried, Grieving for a Lost Home, in THE URBAN 
CONDITION 151 (Leonard J. Duhl ed., 1963)) and Mindy Thompson Fullilove, 
Psychiatric Implications of Displacement: Contributions from the Psychology of Place, 
153 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1516, 1517 (1996) (“The main proposition presented here is that 
the sense of belonging, which is necessary for psychological well-being, depends on 
strong, well-developed relationships with nurturing places. A major corollary of this 
proposition is that disturbance in these essential place relationships leads to 
psychological disorder.”). 
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A. The Gentrification Trigger  
The first issue in structuring protection for in-place 
residents is how to determine when gentrification is occurring. 
The two phenomena most often mentioned are increased 
housing and retail prices, and a higher percentage of high-
income whites becoming homeowners (although some omit the 
racial designation). Needless to say, for constitutional and 
other reasons, linking the trigger for gentrification to the 
percentage of people of a particular race is a nonstarter. The 
same concerns, however, do not apply if the trigger is a 
particular increase in prices. For ease of example, I presume 
that gentrification occurs when rental and home purchase 
prices have increased by 25 percent over a two-year period. 
Addressing displacement would be fairly straightforward. 
One option is simply to reinstate rent control in its most 
stringent form to prevent any further increase in rent. As has 
often been argued, however, this regulatory approach has the 
effect of imposing all the costs of preserving community interests 
on property owners, and it creates other perverse incentives, 
where people who could reasonably afford higher rents remain 
in apartments they would ordinarily leave, artificially 
constricting supply.75  
A second option that spreads the cost more evenly, and 
which could be more carefully calibrated, would be to issue a 
voucher to cover the increased rental costs to all renters able to 
establish that they had lived or operated a business in the 
neighborhood for a set number of years. Arguably, those 
entitled to the voucher would include the grown children of 
people who had lived in the neighborhood for the set number of 
years, since they would have inherited the home had their 
parents been homeowners rather than renters. The voucher 
would be available for a set number of years; five years is the 
number that is often given when eminent domain is at issue.76 
An additional option would be to offer these same residents a 
very low-cost guaranteed loan with a minimal down payment to 
allow for purchase of a home.77 
  
 75 See Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control Revisited: One Reply to Seven Critics, 
54 BROOK. L. REV. 1281, 1293-94 (1989). 
 76 See BECHER, supra note 17, at 291 n.13. 
 77 While this may seem exceedingly generous, in negotiated redevelopment 
plans, residents have been granted “self-amortizing mortgages” for the difference between 
the price of their homes and the price of newly built homes. They would gain title and the 
new mortgage would be paid in full if the family stayed in the residence. Id. at 253. 
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Devising the number of years required to receive the 
voucher would be challenging. If the goal is to essentially 
recognize and compensate for the governmental failures that 
resulted in the conditions of the neighborhood deteriorating, a 
rather long residential requirement might be warranted. A 
long requirement would both reflect the period after which the 
government ceased to engage in explicit wrongdoing, and also 
recognize those who have truly invested in the neighborhood 
through their continued presence.78 In the eminent domain 
context, however, tenants who have rented for lesser periods of 
time—eight years, in one example—have been eligible for 
relocation benefits.79 
The rental voucher or low-cost loan would directly address 
the displacement concerns. Any long-term resident (or their 
children) would have the option of remaining in the neighborhood. 
And while perhaps paradoxical, I argue that such a voucher or 
loan option should also be transferable out of the neighborhood, 
which would offer true choice and autonomy for in-place 
residents. When long-term residents or business owners and their 
children have choice and autonomy, the anger over any change to 
the culture of the neighborhood would seem to be quelled. 
Once current residents have a choice of whether to stay 
or move, there is the potential for residents to organize and 
persuade other residents and business owners to stay. If many 
current residents and business owners were to remain, the 
retail offerings and street life would likely not change in any 
meaningful way. Or if they did, the change would occur on the 
residents’ own terms. If too few people stayed, those who 
remained might feel a sense of loss but not, presumably, a 
sense that outsiders pushed out their neighbors. 
If most voucher holders remain, one presumes the 
gentrification cycle would either slow down considerably or halt 
altogether. Gentrifiers tend to come in waves—artists and 
others seeking low rent and an “authentic” community, families 
seeking diverse neighborhoods, and then, as amenities follow, 
  
 78 See id. Some might argue that such a residency requirement would benefit 
only a few and, as I noted earlier, many low-income people relocate fairly frequently—
perhaps due to job demands, or for other reasons. Those who have lived in 
neighborhoods like the particular gentrifying neighborhood for the same number of 
years would be denied any recompense for the various deteriorated neighborhoods in 
which they lived. However, as Becher convincingly argues, we tend to value those who 
have invested in their communities—and if this investment is not financial, it may be 
time and energy expended. Id. at 9. 
 79 Id. at 291-92. 
2013] PRESERVING AUTONOMY 337 
 
wealthier families whose capital drives the housing costs and 
retail demands even higher. If most in-place residents remain, 
however, a lack of supply would prevent the subsequent waves. 
Although this harms the economic interests of landlords, in 
gentrifying neighborhoods, rental properties were among those 
that were devalued by the disinvestment and abandonment, 
and so landlords would have been able to buy very cheaply 
initially, which mitigates any equity concerns.80  
B. Affirmatively Furthering Fair Gentrification 
In the Fair Housing Act of 1968, Congress required 
HUD and its grantees to do more than combat private housing 
discrimination. In recognition of HUD’s own legacy of segregation, 
HUD has a mandate to actively promote integration.81 The 
obligation to “affirmatively further fair housing” has been 
integrated by HUD in its 2010–2015 strategic plan, which 
includes the pledge that HUD will operate its programs “with an 
eye toward ensuring choice and opportunity for all people 
pursuing the promise of a better life.”82 HUD has included these 
goals in the criteria by which it will judge applications for 
grants from cities and regional development offices.83 
Government played a significant role in creating the 
conditions that led to the harms of in-place residents; therefore, 
government at the city and federal levels ought to lead the 
effort to eliminate the aspects of gentrification that generate 
the most intense opposition. And given HUD’s mandate, cities 
experiencing gentrification have the option of seeking HUD 
funds to counter the current dynamic, which continues the 
cycle of denying autonomy to residents of urban neighborhoods.  
Neighborhoods undergoing gentrification generally 
experience significant influxes of private wealth and political 
clout. This combination tends to generate increased commercial 
activity and governmental services and amenities. If in-place 
residents have the financial means to remain, they will ideally be 
able to benefit from the employment opportunities, educational 
opportunities, and other quality of life improvements that are 
  
 80 See KENNEDY & LEONARD, supra note 27, at 11. 
 81 See POVERTY & RACE RESEARCH ACTION COUNCIL (PRRAC), AFFIRMATIVELY 
FURTHERING FAIR HOUSING AT HUD: A FIRST TERM REPORT CARD 1 n.2 (Jan. 2013) 
[hereinafter PRRAC], available at http://www.prrac.org/pdf/HUDFirstTermReportCard.pdf.  
 82 U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HUD STRATEGIC PLAN, FY 2010–2015, at 4 
(May 2010), available at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=DOC_4436.pdf. 
 83 PRRAC, supra note 81, at 3. 
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precisely the qualities HUD seeks to incentivize in its pursuit of 
“Mixed-Income Communities of Opportunity.”84 Accordingly, the 
federal government should be encouraged to expend funds to 
transform gentrification into a strategy for affirmatively 
furthering fair housing, rather than allow it to continue as yet 
another racialized dynamic that denies autonomy to the black 
and Latino families that remained in neighborhoods that were 
hard hit by the policies of last century. 
CONCLUSION 
In this article, I suggest a modified market model as 
among the potential responses to the politically contentious 
process of gentrifying neighborhoods. My goal is to illuminate 
what true autonomy or choice would look like for in-place 
residents of gentrifying neighborhoods and to suggest that 
supporting such autonomy should have the result of fulfilling 
one of HUD’s underenforced mandates to promote integration. 
  
 84 Id. 
